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Michael Da Silva*

A Goal-Oriented Understanding of the
Right to Health Care and its Implications
for Future Health Rights Litigation

International human rights law recognizes a right to health. A majority of domestic
constitutions recognize health-related rights. Many citizens believe that they
have a moral right to health care. Some theorists agree. Yet the idea of a right
to health care remains controversial. Specifying the nature of such a right invites
more controversy. Indeed, most models of the right face persistent problems
that threaten to undermine the conceptual coherence of a right to health care.
This article accordingly sketches preliminary arguments for a new, goal-oriented
model of the right to health care. It explains that the model avoids most of the
problems facing other models, explains the key insights of those competing
models, is consistent with international law, and provides metrics for assessing
fulfillment of the right. It then explains the model's potential relevance for future
health rights litigation in Canada.
Le droit international en matiere de droits de la personne reconnait le droit a la
santd. La majorit6 des constitutions nationales reconnaissent les droits lids a la
santd. De nombreux citoyens croient qu'ils ont un droit moral aux soins de santd.
Certains thdoriciens sont d'accord. Pourtant, le concept d'un droit aux soins de
sant6 reste controvers6. Prdciser la nature d'un tel droit amplifie la controverse.
En effet, la plupart des modeles du droit moral a la sant6 se heurtent a des
problemes persistants qui menacent de miner la coherence conceptuelle d'un
droit aux soins de santd. L'auteur esquisse donc les arguments prdliminaires
pour 'adoption d'un nouveau modele du droit aux soins de sant6, lequel serait
axe sur les objectifs. 11 explique que le modele propose 6vite la plupart des
problemes qu'6prouvent d'autres modeles et explique les principaux elments de
ces derniers. 11 ajoute que le modele propose est conforme au droit international
et comporte des mesures pour 6valuer Iexercice du droit. L'auteur fait ensuite
ressortir la pertinence potentielle du modele pour les futurs litiges relatifs aux
droits de la sant6 au Canada.
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Introduction
Current forms of Canadian health rights litigation must untie jurisprudential
knots before achieving mainstream health rights advocates' progressive

goals. Whether it is worth untying them in court depends on whether the
intended ends are actually laudable and achievable. Litigation is not a tool
for merely clearing up conceptual confusion. It is a technical procedure
for achieving certain ends. When considering the future of health law
in Canada, my desire is to identify the ends that such litigation should
achieve. Part of this work is scrutiny of what a health right actually is and
what it means to fulfill it. I believe that identifying the intended ends of
appeals to health rights could also clear up the aforementioned conceptual
confusion by demonstrating that purported health rights are constituted
by their intended ends. The right to health care (RTHC) in particular
is best understood as a set of goals that are often (perhaps mistakenly)
placed under a common rights-based heading. One of my prospective
contributions to the future of health law is an argument for this theory
of the RTHC and explanation of its implications. My hope is that future
health rights litigation will seek to fulfill these goals.
A full argument for this goal-oriented model of the RTHC should
identify problems with existing models of the right and explain and
motivate the competing model. It should also discuss how the goal-oriented
model addresses other models' problem areas. To explore the implications
of this model for future health rights litigation, one should then identify the
content of the right, measures for how to fulfill the content, how and when
health right litigation could fulfill deficiencies in those measures, and why
health rights litigation should focus on fulfilling those deficiencies. This
complete account is impossible in the space allotted.'

1.

Indeed, the complete account constitutes much of my doctoral dissertation and other works.
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This paper is thus a preliminary effort at explaining what agoal-oriented
RTHC might look like and why one may want to adopt the model. I begin
by explaining deficiencies with existing views. I then outline arguments
for my view, including a claim that it avoids some problems with existing
models. As part of this discussion, I address lingering weaknesses with
the model. Finally, I present the preliminary case for the claim that future
health rights litigation should seek to promote the RTHC's constitutive
goals.
I. Issues with existing models of the right to health care
There are two major models of the RTHC. Moral theories seek to identify
reasons people have a moral RTHC (and explain why it should be fulfilled
through the law). Legal theories explain why legal authority must be used
to recognize a RTHC. Some look to the law and legal practice to explain
the nature of the right.2 Both model types face a variety of challenges.
While some permutations of each avoid the criticisms better than others,
the non-goal-oriented variants of both types run into some persistent
problems.
Some classic theoretical and practical challenges to the RTHC can be
easily met, but others continue to plague most, if not all, of the dominant
models of the RTHC. First, the argument from the nature of rights suggests
that there can be no RTHC because no one owes a duty to fulfill that right.3
This challenge can met in ethics with relative ease. But there is reason
to question whether a solution to the problem has legal implications.
The traditional understanding of rights as claims defines a right as A's
entitlement to X from B.' A right must be held by an individual and entails
specific correlative duties by others. X could be a good, a service, or a
freedom. One could have a right to payment for services or to picnic on

2.
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, "Human Rights Without Foundations" in Samantha Besson & John
Tasioulas, eds, The Philosophy ofInternationalLaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 321;
Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Jonathan
Wolff, The Human Right to Health (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2012).
3.
This language appears in Gopal Sreenivasan, "II-AHuman Right to Health? Some Inconclusive
Scepticism" (2012) 86:1 Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 239 to describe an issue with the
broader right to health. A similar argument against the RTHC is commonly invoked in debates on
that topic. Sreenivasan also presents an argument from the nature of health that highlights the fact
that, even in a world of unlimited health-care goods, the right to health can never be fulfilled. While
health care is subject to resource constraints, the RTHC does not face an analogous challenge to
Sreenivasan's anti-right to health argument from the nature of health
4.
This structure is a standard reading of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, "Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning" (1913) 23:1 Yale LJ 16 at 31. Some take Hohfeld's
observation that in "ordinary legal discourse" rights tend to be viewed as correlative with duties to be
a feature of rights. See, e.g., Sreenivasan, supra note 3. Hohfeld's work pertained to legal rights, but
his structure is commonly invoked in the moral domain
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a public lawn. The service-recipient would then have a duty to give the
rights-holder money. Everyone would have a (defeasible) duty not to stop
the picnicker from laying down her blanket. The claim-right framework
purportedly entails that there cannot be a moral right to health because one
cannot identify particular individuals who could fulfill the right and thus
cannot identify even candidate duty-bearers. Governments are plausible
duty-bearers for health rights, but granting that leaves questions about what
the duties entail, raising further problems identified below. Recognizing
this fact, health rights advocates highlight the distinction between perfect
duties that specify a particular action a duty-bearer must perform and
imperfect duties that specify a domain of actions that a duty-bearer must
take steps to perform.6 Yet this distinction may not provide a good model
for legal health-care duties. Immanuel Kant, who is commonly cited as
the originator of imperfect duties, deemed them ethical "duties of virtue,"
not legal duties.' Non-Kantians too may have reasons not to work towards
having the legal reflect the moral. Even if one could identify a moral
RTHC, working to ensure that the law reflects the domain of morality in
which it is operative is bound to be expensive. These costs are ill-spent
where moral boundaries remain fuzzy. Imperfect governmental duties to
provide health care may not entail a duty to legally entrench a RTHC.
Indeed, attempting to make the law reflect ethics may not count in favor
of arguments offered by health rights advocates. For instance, health
rights litigants' desire to recognize a positive dimension of constitutional
rights leads some to advocate elimination of the positive/negative rights
distinction. But that tool is useful in ethics.9
Other problems are more persistent for most theories. Consider,
second, the problem of scope. At one extreme, an overly expansive set
of entitlements threatens to make the RTHC a force for state instability
or a hollow aspirational ideal. If the RTHC entails that individuals should
be entitled to even a large number of expensive health-care goods, states

5.
Hohfeld, ibid at 32 states that "claim" could be a synonym for "right" but does not use the term
"claim-right."
6.
Amartya Sen, "Elements ofa Theory of Human Rights" (2004) 32:4 Philosophy & Public Affairs
315 at 346.
7.
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics ofMorals, translated by Mary Gregor (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1996) at 153. Imperfect duties are admittedly mentioned in the legal section at 32.
8.
Stephen Holmes & Cass Sunstein, The Costs ofRights (New York: WW Norton & Co, 1999)
provides one leading denial of the positive rights/negative rights distinction at, e.g., 43.
9.
Michael Da Silva, Review Essay: Jeff King, JudgingSocialRights: Cambridge University Press,
2012, ISBN 9781107 400 320, 370 pp. (2015) 9:3 ICL Journal: Vienna J Int'l Constitutional L 463 at
470 n 47.
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who attempt to fulfill their RTHC obligations risk economic default."o
Government budgets are limited. A large number of successful health
claims may create debts beyond those limited budgets. This can restrict
states' abilities to realize other rights." At the other extreme, a right to a
single health-care good is not easily described as a RTHC. Such a right is
best described as a right to thatgood. The RTHC is then empty. Identifying
where to stop between these extremes is difficult.
This relates to the third problem, which we can call the problem of
principles of scope: it is difficult to articulate a principle for selecting
which goods ought to be covered. Attempts to solve this problem often
raise more questions about what to cover than they solve. For instance,
identifying the goods necessary to ensure all individuals have equality
of opportunity is difficult since the nature of equality of opportunity is
itself contested.12 Likewise, suggesting that "full coverage of 'key' health
interventions should be an initial benchmark towards universal coverage"13
shifts the problem to determining what is "key." Similar problems likely
plague most candidate principles.
Finally, the list of goods required to fulfill a right to health will vary
over time and space as new goods are developed. Call this the problem
of time and space. International human rights law provides some clues
about what ought to be covered under the RTHC." Yet it is unlikely
that these goods are immutably necessary. Health-care needs also differ
between states. Demography and geography make this inevitable. For
a geographical example, tropical rainforest climates require more antimalarial interventions. Economic differences make this problem acute. If
10. E.g., Colombia claimed that their domestic right crippled them financially; Alicia Ely Yamin,
Oscar Parra-Vera & Camilla Gianella, "Colombia: Judicial Protection of the Right to Health: An
Elusive Promise?" in Alicia Ely Yamin & Siri Gloppen, eds, Litigating Health Rights: Can Courts
Bring More Justice to Health? (Cambridge: International Human Rights Clinic, Human Rights
Program, Harvard Law School, 2011) 103 at 121.
11. Charles Fried, "Positive Rights" in Right and Wrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1978) 108.
12. See, e.g., Gerry Cohen, Why Not Socialism? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) at
14-24.
13. Lawrence 0 Gostin & Eric A Friedman, "Towards a Framework Convention on Global Health:
A Transformative Agenda for Global Health Justice" (2013) 13:1 Yale J Health Pol'y L & Ethics 1 at
40.
14.

The international right to health is enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic,

Social and CulturalRights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, art 12 (entered into force 3 January
1976) [ICESCR]. For clues about the content of its health components, see, e.g., Convention on the
Elimination ofAll Forms ofDiscriminationAgainst Women, 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13, arts

11-12; Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, arts 24(2)(b),(d),(f);
General Comment No 14 (2000): The right to the highest attainablestandard ofhealth (article12 of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights), UNCESCR, 22nd Sess, UN

Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) at para 36 [GC 14].
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the RTHC only covers essential medicines, it is arguably of little value
for the people of well-developed nations who are already entitled to those
goods. If it includes more advanced medicines that citizens of such nations
may require, it will go unfulfilled in poorer nations. Any RTHC must be
sensitive to these variations in needs and circumstances."
There are, then, a variety of challenges with which existing models
of the RTHC must contend. I lack sufficient space to explain why each
existing model cannot negate all of these criticisms. Again, some versions
face the criticisms better than others. I hint at some reasons why above
and provide some further detail explaining why the goal-oriented model
avoids the bulk of these criticisms below. The goal-oriented model's
ability to avoid these criticisms is just one reason why one should prefer it
to existing alternatives.
II. Motivating the goal-orientedright to health care
The best understanding of the RTHC in both law and ethics suggests that
it is not a traditional right but shorthand for a set of goals we can use to
assess health-care system performance. The right to health care is best
understood as a catch-all for a series of important, related goals rather than
a traditional claim-right with clear correlative duties and duty-bearers.
More specifically, the RTHC is a plurality of claims to (1) a functioning
health-care system, (2) fair allocation of health-care goods, and (3) the
goods necessary to live a dignified existence. These goal-based aspects
of the RTHC are related. Each is required for persons to live dignified
lives and could be grounded in reciprocity for government power over
their lives. The three aspects are nonetheless unique. For instance, (1) is
a collective right held by persons in concert while the content of (3) more
closely resembles the type of goods individuals could claim. The aspects
are also severable. One can achieve an aspect without achieving another
and each aspect implies different metrics for success. Yet, ultimately, the
RTHC is only fully realized when (1) includes (2) and (2) maximizes
individuals' access to (3). All of these claims are made in the service of a

15. Part of this problem is avoided in the legal domain by the international right's built-in resource
constraint. The right is only to the highest attainable standard of health Poor nations are not obligated
to (immediately) provide seeming luxury goods even as part of the so-called "minimum core" in
General Comment No 3: The nature of States parties'obligations(art. 2, para 1, of the Covenant),

UNCESCR, 5th Sess, UN Doc E/1991/23 (1990) at para 11 [GC 3].This fact about resource constraints
does not exhaust the question of whether luxury goods are the type of goods we would want the RTHC
to guarantee.
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broader claim to (4) improved health, though recognizing a right to health
as such faces all of the concerns above and some others.1 6
This understanding (1) avoids the brunt of the criticisms discussed
above, (2) accounts for many of the insights of the moral and legal
understandings of the RTHC, (3) is supported by international human
rights law, and (4) suggests measures that one can use to evaluate whether
health rights litigation is valuable. In this section, I sketch the arguments
for these claims to motivate the goal-oriented model.
To begin, recognizing a procedural aspect of the RTHC helps
avoid several problems with existing models of this right. The right to
procedural fairness is widely recognized as a right with a clear duty-bearer:
government decision-makers. Where fair decision-making procedures
exist, there is no need to define an exclusive, eternal basket of goods and
services that will serve as the content of the RTHC. The problem of scope
is solved by decision-makers in a fair system. Those decision-makers can
alter the composition of the basket in light of changes, helping to avoid
the problem of time and space. One needs an account about what fairness
entails in order to define the set of acceptable principles for identifying
those goods, but fairness can allow for a variety of principles for decision
making, again avoiding the worst aspects of that concern.
Yet an exclusively procedural RTHC cannot avoid many of the
problems with existing models of the right. A RTHC without a minimal
floor of goods that must be included seems at odds with the meaning of
the phrase "the right to health care." If the RTHC is just a pre-existing,
uncontroversial right to procedural fairness, the RTHC is redundant. If the
concept is redundant, it is difficult to explain why the controversies above
exist. It would be even more difficult to explain why health rights litigants
demand more than fair procedures without accusing them of confusion.
A moral RTHC, then, must have unique content and practical versions
of the RTHC seek more than fair procedures. The goal-oriented RTHC
best avoids the problems identified above by recognizing that it has a
procedural component, but the concept of the RTHC only has its intended
benefits when it has minimal substantive content. Providing that content
likely requires a functioning health-care system. Such a system may also
be necessary as the subject of fair decision making. The goal-oriented

16. See, e.g., note 3. Note further that identifying the particular social determinants of health that
ought to be covered under a right to health would also arguably run into each of the problems identified
above. Problems with identifying candidate duty-bearers are even more acute for some of the social
determinants and the costs of fulfilling rights to, e.g., a healthy environment would be astronomical
even when compared with the most expensive version of the RTHC.
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RTHC ultimately reflects the insights of competing model types and, by
recognizing insights of both, avoids criticisms that attach to each.
The goal-oriented model of the RTHC gains further support from its
consistency with legal practice. Practice suggests that (at least) (1)-(3)
are existing aims of health rights litigants. In the Canadian context, many
challenges are framed as claims to essential services." Others address the
fairness of allocation decisions." Some focus on attempted cuts to the
health-care system.1 9 On the goal-oriented model, advocates who invoke
the language of the RTHC are not completely misguided. Many seek
important ends, including the fulfillment of pre-existing rights like the
right to fairness in the distribution of public goods. While discussion of a
"right" to health care suggests that it will resemble traditional individual
claim-rights, the RTHC in legal practice seems to be a catch-all for a
variety of interests, including individual claim-rights, collective claimrights, and concerns with broader consequential outcomes. Even if the
term "RTHC" is philosophically problematic, practice suggests that it is
and can be invoked to refer to claims for a series of less controversial, less
problematic ends.
There are also moral reasons to support the goal-oriented model.
Critics of the philosophical concept grant that their attacks may not
apply to advocates who "are happy to use the language of rights in a
looser fashion than philosophical strictures require."20 My pluralist,
instrumental approach better reflects the moral status of the RTHC. There
are good reasons to suggest that governments already owe (imperfect)
duties to ensure all three goals are realized. Governments must provide
a functioning health-care system to ensure that all persons have a de
minimus level of well-being required for a dignified life. Persons have
at most few moral reasons to submit to governmental authority if the
government cannot provide better security than life outside governmental
control. Governmental powers, including the power to regulate healthcare provision, are best justified where government can ensure a dignified
level of well-being. No one person has a right to a functioning health-care
system, but a collective right to such a system follows from the nature
of government authority. For the same reasons, the system must ensure
that people can access the goods necessary for a dignified existence.

17. E.g., the unsuccessful claim inAuton v British Columbia (AG), 2004 SCC 78, [2004] 3 SCR 657
was criticized as trying to create a freestanding right to all necessary treatments.
18. E.g., fairness arguably motivates section 15 equality claims like Cameron v Nova Scotia (AG),
(1999), 204 NSR (2d) 1, 177 DLR (4th) 611 (NSCA).
19.

See, e.g., CanadianDoctorsfor Refugee Care v Canada (AG), 2014 FC 651, [2015] 2 FCR 267.

20.

Sreenivasan, supra note 3 at 240.
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Individuals arguably should be able to take the government account for the
provision of these goods. Procedural fairness in the distribution not only
of essential goods, but in allocation decisions about non-essential goods,
follows from the government's non-controversial duty to recognize that
all persons are free and equal and decisions must reflect their equal status.
This requires that decisions could theoretically be accepted by equal
persons. Transparent use of publicly acceptable reasons and opportunity to
challenge allocation decisions based on improper reasons is demanded by
political morality regardless of whether we recognize a RTHC.2 1 At worst,
then, (1)-(3) comprise a mix of pre-existing rights and things we should
expect from governments. (4) is a valuable goal from a consequentialist
perspective and there may be non-consequential reasons to support it too.
The goal-oriented understanding, then, is supported by practice-based
and moral arguments for the RTHC. The goal-oriented RTHC also gains
support from its consistency with international human rights law. A full
argument for this claim requires an article length manuscript of its own.
Yet even a cursory glance at the relevant legal materials makes it clear that
the international right to health, which includes an international RTHC,
consists of a multiplicity of goals and no one goal exhausts the content of
the right. The international right is explicitly not a right to any health care
that an individual may require.22 It is a variety of procedural and substantive
rights that fall short of full health-care provision. These rights mirror the
goals of the RTHC identified above. International human rights law clearly
requires a functioning health-care system.2 3 International human rights
law's further requirement for a national health-care strategy arguably
also requires procedural fairness in deciding how that system will run.2 4
Even if that argument fails, international human rights law's foundational
commitments to non-discrimination and equality clearly require procedural
fairness in decisions about what a national health-care system should cover

21. See the work of Norman Daniels & James E Sabin, including Norman Daniels & James E Sabin
"Limits to Health Care: Fair Procedures, Democratic Deliberation, and the Legitimacy Problem for
Insurers" (1997) 26:4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 303 and Norman Daniels & James E Sabin Setting
Limits Fairly: Learning to Share Resourcesfor Health, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2008).
22. E.g., GC 14, supra note 14 at para 7.
23. Ibid guarantees "the right to a system of healthprotectionwhichprovides equality of opportunity
for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health."
24. These requirements appear in documents including ibid at paras 36, 53 and DeclarationofAlmaAta, International Conference on Primary Health Care, 6-12 September 1978 (Geneva: World Health
Organization 1978) at art VIII [Alma-Ata].
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and how care should be provided within it.25 International human rights
law's further foundational commitment to dignity, in turn, suggests that any
rights within it ought to promote dignity.26 This supports a minimal level of
content that any RTHC should contain under an international human rights
law framework. International human rights law's further commitment to a
minimum core of rights,27 the inclusion of certain goods that are arguably
necessary for a dignified existence within that core,28 and the necessary
prioritization of certain goods required by vulnerable persons who may be
most apt to be forced below a dignified level of existence29 also support a
minimum floor for the content of the international RTHC and a concern
with dignity in identifying the content of that floor. The minimum core's
recognition that some aspects of the right do not need to be immediately
fulfilled further suggests that international human rights law recognizes
that these aspects are best understood as goals, rather than immediate
entitlements.30 The international RTHC, in other words, is not merely a
right to particular health-care goods, but a plurality of commitments to
achieve certain goals. International human rights law is consistent with the
goal-oriented understanding of the RTHC.
Finally, the goal-oriented model of the RTHC suggests measurements
one can use to assess whether health-care systems are fulfilling the right.

25. E.g., the ICESCR, supra note 14's references to "equal and inalienable rights of all" and the
rights of "everyone" reflect foundational values of equality and non-discrimination; General Comment
20: Non-discriminationin economic, social and cultural rights, UNCESCR, 42nd Sess, UN Doc

E/C.12/GC/20 (2009) at para 3. International Human Rights Law, then, requires a fair system for
making health-care allocation decisions where fair systems cover goods necessary for a dignified
existence. International human rights law also provides guidance for decision-makers in a fair system.
Fair decision-making in a system ought to account for these directives. E.g., the so-called "AAAQ"
framework requires provision ofa sufficient quantity ofculturally sensitive, ethically and scientifically
appropriate and quality goods in an accessible manner; GC 14, supra note 14 at para 12.
26. The importance of dignity is recognized in nearly every relevant modern IHRL document,
beginning with Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess,

Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810, (1948), Preamble, art 1 [UDHR].
27. See GC 3, supra note 15 at paras 1, 10; GC 14, supra note 14 at para 30.
28. Primary health-care and essential medicines are clearly included within the minimum core.
See, e.g., ibid; GC 14, ibid at para 17; General Comment No 15 (2013) on the right of the child to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standardof health (art. 24), UNCRC, 62nd Sess, UN Doc

CRC/C/GC/15 (2013) at para 94 [GC 15]; Alma-Ata, supra note 24 at V Definitions of"primary" and
"essential" can track "necessary for a dignified existence."
29. See infra note 50 for international human rights law passages emphasizing the importance
of vulnerable populations in interpreting the right to health. This can include prioritizing them in
specifying the right's content. For instance, maternal and infant care is consistently prioritized and
infants, at least, are clearly vulnerable as individuals and as a class; see, e.g., GC 14, supra note 14
at paras 43-44; General recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (women and health),

UNCEDAW, 22nd Sess, UN Doc A/54/38/Rev. 1, ch 1 (1999) at para 6 [GR 24].
30. States only need to progressively realize aspects of rights outside the minimum core; UDHR,
supra note 26, Preamble; ICESCR, supra note 14, art 2.
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The outcomes can be used to assess whether interventions, including legal
interventions, are worthwhile. Outcomes that help fulfill the ends of the
right are (all-else-being-equal) the best outcomes for fulfilling the ends we
mean to discuss when we talk about a RTHC. This suggests that the goaloriented model of the RTHC has instrumental value. This instrumental
value should be unsurprising given that the model is specifically designed
around instrumental ends. I discuss these instrumental values in further
detail below when exploring the implications of the goal-oriented model
for future health rights litigation. But I should first contend with lingering
criticisms of the goal-oriented model of the RTHC, including the claim
that the instrumental focus of the model undermines the rights-based
nature of the claim. I now turn to these criticisms.
III. Lingering concerns with the goal-orientedmodel
Where the proceeding is a mere sketch of the larger argument for the goaloriented RTHC, it would be surprising if other concerns with the model
did not linger. I will now address two of the most immediate concerns.
First, one may argue that this understanding of the RTHC means that the
RTHC is not a right at all. The goal-oriented model of the RTHC seems to
concede the status of the RTHC to the rights skeptic. It suggests that the
model is not a model of a right, but a model of a rhetorical placeholder for
a variety of important claims, only some of which qualify as stand-alone
rights on even expansive models of rights that recognize that there can be
imperfect duties to fulfill rights. It is tempting to respond to this criticism
by stating "That's the point! Traditional understandings of the RTHC are
confused and the goals people talk about when discussing the RTHC are
better understood as a variety of severable claims." But that response risks
being too flippant and concessive. Instead, it is worth recognizing that
the RTHC framework helps to highlight the connections between these
important interests, provides rhetorical power for claims to fulfillment of
the important interests, and fits with the (sometimes confused) language
of international human rights law. I may concede that the RTHC is not
a stand-alone right on any traditional or even standard understanding of
rights. But to say that the RTHC is not a traditional claim-right is not to say
that it is useless. If this model forces me to abandon the rights framework
for these claims, it does not undermine the fact that the (now improperly
named) RTHC models important moral interests and their relations and
provides a rhetorically valuable language for discussing those interests. It
also does not change the fact that such a right exists in international law.
Second, one may charge that the goal-oriented model ofthe RTHC does
not actually avoid the problem of scope and the problem of time and space.
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While a strictly procedural model of the right can avoid these concerns,
the problems threaten to recur when one requires a floor for the content of
the right. Invoking the concept of dignity to set the minimum floor seems
particularly problematic. Dignity is a famously contentious concept. The
Supreme Court of Canada accordingly recognized the limitations of the
concept in the equality context.31 Many are dubious that dignity can help
solve the problem of scope or the problem of time and space if arguably
less contentious concepts such as equality of opportunity failed.32
Dignity is not, however, a necessarily problematic concept. One
should not take debates about how to understand the concept as dispositive
proof that the concept cannot be coherently interpreted in a way that can
guide both moral and legal decision-making. Recent works provide ample
insight into the moral and legal concepts of human dignity.33 It is hard
to see why human dignity should be any more difficult to interpret than
equality, autonomy, or other contentious moral concepts that many are
happy to accept as bases for ethical and legal posits. Moreover, there is no
reason to suggest that dignity would be any less capable as a guidepost for
identifying a discrete list of goods that should serve as the floor for any
RTHC. Whatever dignity might mean, failing to provide goods necessary
for people to even be able to manage their chronic pain fails to meet the
dignity standard. At worst, then, dignity is on a par with alternatives in its
ability to meet the problems of scope and time and space. At best, dignity
can help identify a discrete set of goods that constitute the floor of the
right. A full argument to that effect must wait for another day. Until then,
heuristics can be valuable.34 Even if this and other defenses of dignity
ultimately fail, the fact that alternatives encounter the same issues suggests
that a strictly content-focused right will be problematic. This supports the
31.

R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483 [Kapp] accordingly removed the dignity analysis

from analyses of potential violations of section 15 of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms,
Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. Kapp

was subsequently superseded by Withler v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 SCR 396.
32. This criticism is a health rights-specific variant of a general argument that dignity is a contextspecific concept that cannot ground a universal human rights claim that appears in, e.g., Christopher
McCrudden, "Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights" (2008) 19:4 European J of
Int'lL 655 (though even McCrudden recognizes it may have some value in the minimum core context)
and arguably underlies the pleadings inKapp, ibid.
33. See Jeremy Waldron, "Dignity, Ranks, and Rights: Lecture 1: Dignity and Rank" in Meir DanCohen, ed, Dignity, Rank, and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 13 for a good moral
argument. Several interesting responses appear in the same volume. Michael Rosen expands his view
in Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2012). See
Aharon Barak, Human Dignity: The ConstitutionalValue and the ConstitutionalRight (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2015) for an account of a strictly legal right to dignity.
34. As noted below, international human rights law provides a list of goods that must be prioritized
and that could be used as heuristics for the goods necessary to live a dignified life.
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goal-oriented model. Other aspects of the goal-oriented RTHC avoid these
problems, minimizing their threat, but other aspects require some minimal
content for the right to account for all intuitions about the purpose of health
rights. Any goal-oriented model must thus set a minimal floor. Dignity is
no worse than alternatives in its ability to set that floor. The foundational
role of dignity in ethics and law suggests it could be better.3 5
IV. Implicationsfor health rights litigation
If the RTHC is not a traditional right, but a catch-all for a variety of
independent claims, then fulfilling the right as such may not be the proper
aim of health rights litigation. One should take an instrumental rather
than conceptual approach to health rights litigation. Health rights litigants
should pursue the goals inherent in its claims. Identifying deficiencies
in Canada's fulfillment of the constitutive goals of the RTHC could be
important groundwork for further claims. Health rights litigation will
better accord with its purported commitment to the RTHC when it fulfills
the goals the RTHC language is invoked to further. Yet simply stating that
a given intervention should improve procedural fairness or improve access
to the goods necessary to live a dignified life is likely too vague to guide
future health rights litigation. Canadian law, at least, is likely unable to
secure a functioning health-care system on its own. Further metrics of how
to fulfill these goals are accordingly necessary to guide future litigation.
In this section, I accordingly examine metrics for fulfilling the goaloriented RTHC that are suggested by the model and international human
rights law that is consistent with it. In so doing, I articulate a research
project for analyzing whether nations are realizing the constitutive
goals of the RTHC.3 6 A complete account of how nations fare on these
metrics could provide a good base for analyzing how different health-

35. One may also argue that I fail to highlight the importance of improved health outcomes above
and below. Few would be interested in the goals listed above if they did not bear some relation to health
outcomes. While health rights litigation will not always improve health outcomes improving some
health outcomes must be a goal the RTHC is designed to achieve. It may evenbe the primary purpose
of the RTHC. Improved health outcomes are a constitutive goal of the RTHC, but I strategically
do not emphasize them here. Health is an amorphous concept and even less apt to be the proper
object of a right. The problem of scope for a right to health is even more acute than the problem of
scope for a RTHC. Fulfilling a large number of even the imperfect duties such a right would imply is
potentially astronomically expensive. It is also more difficult to measure health and the extent to which
interventions, including legal interventions, affect health outcomes. My hope is that future scholars
will be able to make these causal claims. In the meantime, I can focus on three other aspects of the
RTHC.
36. I recently began publishing research on this topic in the Canadian context elsewhere. In addition
to my forthcoming doctoral dissertation, see Michael Da Silva, "Medicare and the Non-Insured Health
Benefits and Interim Federal Health Programs: A Procedural Justice Analysis" (2016) 10:2 McGill J L
& Health [Da Silva, "Procedural"], which focuses on the procedural elements of the right.
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care systems, cultural structures, and other possible causes help realize

the RTHC. At minimum, it would help identify deficiencies in individual
nations' realization of the RTHC's constitutive goals. Future litigation
could help remedy these deficiencies. Further research on whether and
how different types of litigation actually remedy them would provide
insight into law's ability to help realize the RTHC. Setting out the proper
metrics for realizing the goal-oriented RTHC motivated above is thus just
the beginning of what could be a lengthy future research agenda.
The three goals of the RTHC suggest at least six metrics for assessing
RTHC fulfillment. First, bare facts about the existence of a health-care
system provide metrics for determining the extent to which claims to a
functioning health-care system are being fulfilled. At international law, a
state must have a legally protected health-care system to count as fulfilling
its RTHC obligations.37 The presence thereof is a RTHC implementation
metric. Fairness and international law suggest that it should include a
national health-care policy with indicators and benchmarks for success.38
Both also suggest that people should have the opportunity to participate in
the creation of that policy.39 The presence of a national health-care policy
alone and the presence of fora for participation in the administration of that
policy (through, e.g., public debates on what to cover at a given time) are
clear metrics for fulfillment of the international RTHC and good metrics
for the fulfillment of the goals of its goal-oriented moral RTHC.
Second, the indicators and benchmarks within the policy serve as selfdefined metrics. One can easily identify the bare presence of a national
policy and participation therein. Whether one can identify the extent to
which a state is meeting its indicators and benchmarks will be a case-bycase determination. Much will depend on a state's transparency. Where
one can apply these metrics, they help overcome concerns that the RTHC
can be inattentive to states' differing health-care needs by ensuring one set
of metrics is tailored to states' self-identified needs.

37.

See note 23. General Comment No 15 (2013) on the right of the child to the enjoyment of the

highest attainablestandardofhealth (art. 24), UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 62nd
Sess, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/15 (2013) at para 94 [GC 15] suggests statutory protection of the RTHC
may be required. This could include the national health-care system requirement.
38. The argument from fairness could stem from the problem of time and space and a recognition
that states will need to realize the RTHC differently. It could also stem from criticisms of the RTHC
that suggest that it is a Western construct that is insufficiently attendant to cultural difference. As
noted in the following paragraph, if states can set their own benchmarks and indicators for success,
this builds culture-specific metrics into a broader metric of universal standards. The international law
requirement is in GC 14, supra note 14 at paras 36, 53.
39. The argument from fairness builds on the treatment of reciprocity for authority above. For
relevant international human rights law, see, e.g., Alma-Ata, supranote 24, arts III, art VII(5).

A Goal-Oriented Understanding of the Right to Health Care
and its Implications for Future Health Rights Litigation

391

Third, essential good coverage within the system and rates of access
thereto serve as good metrics for assessing the extent to which states fulfill
RTHC claims to the provision of goods necessary for a dignified existence.
If the RTHC leaves a large number of persons below a dignity level, it
does not fulfill its aims. Where we cannot identify the dignity level and
thus cannot identify the number of persons below it in any given state,
we can only measure whether a process aims at ensuring people access
to the goods needed to live at the dignity level. While a full list of goods
required for a dignified existence is unavailable, acknowledged essential
goods, including primary health care, are plausible examples. The World
Health Organization offers a Model List of Essential Medicines, which
forms part of the aforementioned minimum core.40 This list is the result of
a fair process for identifying the goods to which one ought to be entitled.
It also provides a working understanding of what counts as essential.
The list is constantly updated, which ensures that it addresses changes
over time. It is also sufficiently broad to address problems concerning
differences between states."1 This metric thus helps avoid the problem of
time and space. While the focus on medicines rather than other health-care
goods makes the list incomplete, access to goods on the list could serve
as a heuristic for achieving the medicine-based components of the RTHC.
Whether a system covers these goods is an indicator of its success. In the
absence of agreement on their precise meaning, the paradigm examples of
primary health-care can serve as similar metrics. Non-medicinal healthcare goods, including maternal and infant care, are similarly recognized
as being universally required.4 2 These goods may not perfectly mirror
the goods required to meet the dignity level, but provide a reasonable
approximation. Rates of access thereto are metrics for assessing RTHC

fulfillment.
Fourth, RTHC claims to fairness in health-care allocation decisions
can be measured in part by the presence of a fair process of good
distribution. The bare existence of a process serves in a state's favor. Yet
the fairness of a process admits of degrees. National RTHC assessments
should be tied to the relative fairness of the proceedings. Norman Daniels

40. Particular goods are added and removed over time. World Health Organization, "WHO Model
List of Essential Medicines: 19th List (April 2015) (Final Amendments-November 2015)" (2015),
online: World Health Organization <who.int/medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/en/> is the
19th list.
41. While the present essential drugs list is expansive, it is difficult to get a firm grasp on the
underlying principles of what is currently listed. I hope that it is a reasonable approximation of the
goods needed for a dignified life.
42. See note 29.
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and James Sabin's accountability for reasonableness is a good (and, I
would argue, the best) framework for doing so.43 After all, it reflects of
recognized requirements of political morality." The framework's markers,
including the presence of public display of reasons for decision making,
the use of publicly accepted rationales in those decisions, and the presence
of challenge or appeal procedures, can serve as metrics for the fairness
of health-care entitlement selection procedures." Some of Daniels and
Sabin's metrics have been fruitfully applied to the Canadian health-care
system already.46 This provides a baseline for future research, which
should help track whether Canada is improving fulfillment of (or, in the
language of international human rights law, "progressively realizing"")
the RTHC's procedural elements.
Fifth, measuring the RTHC requires metrics for determining whether
individuals receive their fair share of the goods selected by the fair process.
Where a fair system must cover essential goods, this metric will partly
mirror the essential goods metric above in the ideal case. It will also address
non-essential goods selected through a fair process. A health-care system
must present all persons with an equal opportunity of accessing the goods
selected through fair procedures to fulfill the universality requirements
of the RTHC. One cannot, however, directly measure opportunities and
should instead focus on the extent to which persons are accounted for in
a process and the extent to which they are free from barriers to their fair
share of the selected goods, such as user charges and misapplications of
eligibility criteria. The relevant metrics will include the proportion of the
population qualified to receive goods in the process and the number of
barriers to one's share of goods in a state. Actual rates of access to selected
goods will be relevant where available.
Sixth, recognizing that the RTHC is not static (per the problem of
time and space) requires measuring how states fare over time. Progressive
realization indicators help measure this temporal shift. Progressive
43. See the work of Daniels & Sabin, supra note 21.
44. Colleen M Flood, "Conclusion" in Colleen M Flood, ed, Just Medicare: What s In, What &Out,
How We Decide (Toronto: University Toronto Press, 2006) 449 at 452.
45. For a summary of Daniels & Sabin, supra note 21 that makes these requirements explicit,
see Norman Daniels, "Accountability for Reasonableness: Establishing a Fair Process for Priority
Setting is Easier than Agreeing on Principles" (2000) 321:7272 Brit Med J 1300. For more details of
how these can be metrics for analyzing the procedural fairness of health-care systems, see Da Silva,
"Procedural," supra note 36.
46. See, e.g., Colleen M Flood & Michelle Zimmerman, "Judicious Choices: Health Care Resource
Decisions and the Supreme Court" in JocelynDownie & Elaine Gibson, eds, HealthLaw atthe Supreme
Court ofCanada(Toronto: Irwin Law 2007) 25 at 27. For an update, see Da Silva, "Procedural," supra
note 36.
47. See note 30.
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realization is a core component of all international social rights." In the
absence of an uncontroversial stopping point for the content of the RTHC,
international human rights law invokes progressive realization to suggest
that states ought to continue expanding their RTHC coverage unless they are
in danger of reaching the extreme end of the continuum of possible scopes
where additional coverage would lead to severe economic problems.4 9
This suggests that complete fulfillment of RTHC obligations cannot be
measured by looking at the selection of goods and access thereto at a
given time. This is also a plausible moral position. Progressive realization
requires comparative assessments to take account of changes over time.
Where a state does not score well on other metrics the extent to which
it takes steps to improve counts in its favor. Deliberately retrogressive
removals of required features then will count against states. Removal
of procedural markers of fairness or failure to add these safeguards in a
reasonable timeframe counts against states. Likewise, removing people
from coverage or failing to cover a wide breadth of the population or
prioritize the vulnerable members of that population counts against them.
Failure to increase coverage of goods can also be problematic in certain
circumstances. One should assess whether a state allocates more resources
overtime, but some goods will be removed for good reasons. This justifies
focusing on the rate at which goods are removed without warrant or being
replaced by other goods.
International human rights law, in turn, suggests that these metrics
should be applied at two levels: to the general population and to vulnerable
groups. Contemporary international human rights law is consistently
concerned with the protection and assistance of vulnerable populations."
The goal-oriented understanding of the RTHC could account for this
concern. Prioritizing the vulnerable could be justified to maximize the
number of persons above the dignity level. Fairness and dignity also
require metrics for determining the extent to which states prioritize the
needs of vulnerable populations in the health-care allocation process and
its design. The extent to which processes select goods that vulnerable
populations identify as needs and goods that we reasonably believe
48.
49.
50.

Again, see note 30.
For more on its content, see GC 3, supra note 15 at para 2; GC 14, supra note 14 at para 31.
See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 26, s 25(2); GC 14, supra note 14 at paras 14, 18, 21; GC 15,

supra note 37 at para 98; General Comment No 3 (2003): HIV/AIDs and the rights of the child,

UNCRC, 32nd Sess, UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/3 (2003) at paras 1, 3; General Recommendation No
15: Avoidance of discrimination against women in nationalstrategiesfor the prevention and control
ofacquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), UNCEDAW, 9th Sess, UN Doc A/45/38 (1990);
Beijing Declarationand Platformfor Action, 17 October 1995, UN Docs A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and

A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995) art 93; GR 24, supra note 29 at para 6.
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vulnerable populations need should be useful metrics. There are limits on
the extent to which this ideal comparison can be conducted." At minimum,
the requirement to prioritize the vulnerable suggests that the metrics above
must be studied with respect not only to the general population, but also
to vulnerable populations. Low rates of access to essential goods for
vulnerable populations suggest room for better RTHC fulfillment.
There are, then, six sets of metrics assessing fulfillment of a goaloriented RTHC: the presence of legal protection of a health-care system,
of a national health policy and of participation fora in the development
and administration of the policy, a state's self-defined benchmarks and
indicators of success, the extent to which essential goods are covered by
a system, Daniels and Sabin's fairness metrics, rates of access to essential
goods and the goods selected in the process, and progressive realization
indicators. International human rights law, fairness, and dignity require
vulnerable population-specific variants of some of these metrics.
Research applying the metrics should identify societies' gaps in rights
to health-care coverage. These gaps provide a prima facie case for health
rights litigation. Using the law in the health-care context to fill other goals
when these gaps remain misplaces priorities at best and may undermine
realization of the RTHC at worst. For instance, claims for non-essential
goods can be understood as undermining potential access to essential
goods in a world of scarce resources.52 A failure in RTHC coverage is,
then, a good starting point for future health rights litigation. The question
then becomes whether health rights litigation is the best way to fill these
gaps in coverage. There may be reason to use non-legal means to fill gaps
in RTHC realization. Further research will be necessary to assess whether
legal or non-legal means are more likely to be successful. If legal means
are more successful, then future health rights litigation in Canada should
be primarily concerned with filling identified gaps in Canada's RTHC
realization.

51. For instance, it can be hard to know what goods vulnerable populations require in some
circumstances. It is far from impossible in most contexts.
52. Indeed, health rights in Latin America may have been co-opted by the middle class to improve
their access to non-essential goods, to the detriment of vulnerable populations' access to essential
goods. The data inLatinAmerica are contested, but there is some evidence in support of the co-option
thesis. Mariana Mota Prado, "Provision of Health Care Services and the Right to Health in Brazil:
The Long, Winding and Uncertain Road to Equality" in Colleen M Flood & Aeyal Gross, eds, The
Right to Health at the Public-PrivateDivide:A Global ComparativeStudy (Cambridge: Cambridge

&

University Press, 2014) 319 provides a good summary of the debate. See Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz,
"The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities?" (2009) 11:2 Health
Hum Rts 33 and Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, "Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism
on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America" (2011) 89:7 Texas LR 1669 for contrasting positions.
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Conclusion
Existing models of the RTHC face several challenges. The goal-oriented
model of the RTHC avoids the brunt of many challenges while accounting
forthe insights ofcompeting models. The goal-oriented model also provides
metrics for assessing the extent to which nations fulfill the RTHC. My
current and future research applies these metrics and analyzes the extent
to which legal interventions can remedy deficiencies in fulfillment. My
hope is that future litigation will aim to remedy such deficiencies and will
provide more data for further research on the extent to which law can help
realize the aims of the RTHC. Yet much remains to be done. The account
of the goal-oriented model of the RTHC and potential implications above
is strictly preliminary; it is a mere sketch of a much larger work. Fully
exploring how nations fare on these metrics and whether law can help
them fare even better will require further work still. Regardless of whether
others ultimately accept the goal-oriented model of the RTHC, I hope the
future of health law will include interventions to improve the goals of the
RTHC and research on how best to do it in particular nations.

